NEWSLETTER No.6

Patronage and Merit: before and after Northcote-Trevelyan

From the New World

This year, Trump has abolished Affirmative Action. This, as you may be aware, is the program initiated by President Johnson amongst others whereby ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups (e.g. disabled including war veterans) are given positive, enhanced support in university or civil service recruitment, and also in the award of government contracts.

Trump’s present action is controversial; positive discrimination is defended by many though also challenged by many. The important point to note is that the large government departments are outward facing; they deal with large numbers of the public either as clients or as citizens with duties. These publics will include minorities and the Civil Service must be well oriented towards such groups. Moreover, learning a language and a culture is no simple task and is not to be neglected by ‘quick fix’ Foreign Service Departments.

However, passing exams does not get you to effective job performance. The construction of an effective administrative structure must involve more than simple selection on exam results even though examinations are an essential test of competence. But exam results can be flawed. They may be ill-judged or they may test skills other than job performance.

In the UK, the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms nevertheless paved the way for the administration of all modern governments. But they created a bare, though in principle objective, structure that needed supplementation. Thus, patronage inevitably persists through government administration. But the patronage must be minimal and controlled, and must not overflow its boundaries. There is a need for a sophisticated judgment here, for the purpose of tuning up Northcote-Trevelyan structures.

Way back in 1958, but a century after Northcote-Trevelyan, Michael Young wrote The Rise of the Meritocracy satirising and ridiculing merit-based recruitment and various socialist or progressive causes. Whether he was advocating a uniquely exceptional elite of genius I cannot say for sure, but my inference is, ‘yes he was’. He was way off course; his depth analysis is incoherent. Rules, routines and standards are inevitably part of administrative work and objectivity a necessity. This is a matter of organisation, not simply of patron and client.

Today Trump is trying to ride two horses at once. Besides his removal of Affirmative Action, he is himself recruiting his friends, relatives and political associates into major offices and throwing out current staff, a policy that is not merit-based, but traditionalist and obsolete; and further is an affirmative action on behalf of a personal clientèle. He is far from re-affirming the role of objectivity in the Civil Service. Though personal appointments may be a necessity on the grounds of security or other types of loyalty, in the main they have no place in the large-scale organisations that we see today. My purpose here is to look into some aspects of the detail that a discriminating judgment requires.

Starting With Talcott Parsons

My introduction to administration and bureaucracy was Max Weber’s Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. That edition, translated by Henderson and Parsons in 1947, remains an important work. The original has been re-translated several times since, including by Keith Tribe in 2017. The 1947 translation was somewhat selective and more recent translations, being fuller, are considered less subjective. The original text was still being written at the time of Max Weber’s death and the 1947 translation was focussed on the first four chapters. I read it in Ghana in response to the very obvious administrative problems of the then new nation and the 1966 overthrow of Nkrumah.

On my return to London to study for an MSC, I read many texts in political theory especially those concerned with developing nations. However, on switching to a career in industrial management, my reading switched also to the familiar texts of those days: e.g. Mary Parker Follet, James Burnham, (Lord) Wilfred Brown, Elliott Jaques and Peter Drucker.

I came on the English reports concerning the Civil Service only much later: the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan, the 1918 Haldane and the 1968 Fulton; recently there have been further comments on the subject, for instance by Dominic Cummings. The three reports are well recorded, summarised and commented on the Internet, either in ‘Gov.uk’ or civil service blogs closely associated with government. The remarks that follow are no match to such experience but simply a few personal thoughts formed from experience and the above-mentioned reading.

The Weber text introduced me to the three types of authority, traditional, charismatic and legal-rational. Without further fuss, this makes one thing clear – traditional authority, personal and subjective, must be replaced by modern authority that is founded on law and reason. ‘Charismatic’ remains a basket for exceptions, instance individuals who succeed in standing out as an individual. Talcott Parsons followed Weber in distinguishing between ascriptive orientation and achievement orientation in recruitment and similar matters.

Modernising Administration

The Northcote-Trevelyan reforms had two main results: civil service exams and promotion by merit across the entire administration. Rules were standardised across the whole civil service removing control from heads of government departments. Preceding Weber, it struck a similar note: reform of the Civil Service required entry by examination to establish merit; and standardisation across a multiplicity of departments, each of whose heads previously had enormous powers of patronage. Northcote-Trevelyan’s targets were sinecures, laziness, incompetence, etc. (in their words, ‘the unambitious, indolent and incapable’). But it did not challenge the underlying system of patronage. This is of reduced worth because everyone targets laziness and corruption and it still goes on.

Haldane and Fulton refined Northcote-Trevelyan. Haldane is a significant figure, for his armed forces reforms (just prior to World War I) as much as his report on the ‘machinery of government’. With regard to the latter, his remit was extended beyond administrative matters to include the role of the Cabinet and the introduction of women into administrative roles.

Fulton created a Civil Service Department to handle all personnel matters, considering the Treasury not the best place for this function. But it was abolished after a very short time. Fulton also sought to bring in more scientists and engineers and reduce the role of ‘generalists’ from university classics departments.

I believe that the Treasury should not control personnel. But it does so because capitalism controls the Treasury and appointments and salaries are used as key vehicles of social control. I doubt if Fulton thought he was following Marx, but the view that the ‘owners of the means of production’ control the state originated with Marx and the Treasury is the most evident locus for the transmission of that power. “No taxation without representation” acquires a novel meaning when government debt places the state in the hands of high finance. But it is not tolerable that instead of paying tax, they collect interest on loans to the state.

The size of the Civil Service is worth noticing. It currently employs 550,000 people which is a 20-year high, and far more than the 16,000 of 1854. (But I have little information as to what today’s figure includes. Certainly, the NHS at 1.34 million is not included; nor are the armed forces at 183,000; but here again these categories are not defined.) An organisation of this size cannot be managed by financial dexterity alone, even less by personal political patronage; expertise in organisational and personnel matters is separate and distinct. ‘Objective’ is too often a disguise for the interests of an extreme right, but objectivity in science is something else entirely,

It is hard to imagine a world without the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms. Jibes on the basis that only geniuses are needed are ill-placed, whether as king, dictator or scientist, though ‘strongman’ appears to be a favoured term today. The system prior to Northcote-Trevelyan was one of blatant patronage, obsolete like the electoral rotten boroughs, not long before (1832) thrown out by Parliament. We need these matters re-opened. But sources as well as evidence are difficult.

Patronage Not in Decline

My thesis is that patronage has not been eliminated. However often corruption has been targeted, corruption remains, almost unchanged ... If an elite is replaced, the rewards for the new loyal base, the new elite’s clients, will become the new corruption. The boundaries here are narrow. The old corruption may be thrown out but the new comes in. Personal rewards are accompanied by multiple pressures to compliance, usually subtle and concealed. The pressures to compliance in employment stretch far beyond the boundaries of the job itself, and this results in community covering as a mask for coerced compliance. Civil Service exams, job evaluation and the objective analysis of work ought to result in well-placed appointments on regular salary scales. Patronage can and ought to work within this framework but elite transfers of power rarely do.

When London Business School was set up, and later others, it followed Fulton in one aspect and examination of this can tell us something significant. Quantitative, that is numeric, ability was emphasised. But it proved little more than a disguise, even though it was a pre-requisite. The real process was that of patronage based on a system of personal favour and political compliance, which persisted without challenge. To throw light on this matter we need to look at the workings of the secret state, even though from outside this is near impossible.

In the establishment of London Business School, its leaders followed the above doctrine. As a result, they neglected to understand the structure of an organisation. Further, the model of an industrial organisation was seen as inappropriate for the Civil Service. Yet the model itself was not understood.

If you read back to the literature of the period of the First World War, it was exemplary. Besides Haldane’s work on both military, educational and Civil Service reforms, the early pioneers of the co-operative movement were building a new organisation on a formidable scale and they had a very good understanding of what they were doing.

Returning to the present, Fulton was correct in one respect. Personnel matters should not lie within the domain of the Treasury. There is further a difference between industrial corporation and civil service on the grounds of authority: the former is under private share-based ownership while the latter subject to Ministerial and democratic authority. Yet both are large organisations and these require, as Drucker insisted, a distinctive approach.

Yet today again, the patronage system rules. In the early days the king gifted land to his followers, barons; and he retained a right of recall. Likewise, the local landowner held in his gift not just the farm tenancies on his land but also adjacent positions like the incumbencies of local churches. Patronage then was both extensive and expansive. Today patronage is only recognised in relation to the Arts. This is not satisfactory for it puts philanthropists in a misleadingly benevolent light. But the crudities of patronage are everywhere.

Perhaps one reason this practice is not discussed is that it is not democratic; but a more plausible reason is that it is not meant to be known widely. Yet patronage accompanies the aristocratic principle and the inheritance of property is long recognised. But the inheritance of political office (viz. through House of Lords) is widely recognised as obsolete and illegitimate and rightly so. In other matters a person is entitled to pass on to his descendants the sum of his lifetime experience.

Establishing Limits

In my view the point that needs clarifying is where the boundaries of patronage should lie. It clearly exists even when there Is a public and formal system of appointment as in the Civil Service. But if it can coexist, it cannot override the Civil Service model. To force the appointment of a relative who could not pass the relevant exams is not legitimate. To sack an incumbent outside the legitimate Civil Service procedures is wrong.

But the workings of patronage are worse than this. People are identified and selected long before the exam stage. They may also be hors de combat, that is excluded, on the grounds of remarks made in private and gathered by subterfuge, or of undesirable associations or unacceptable parentage. Covert control means coerced compliance and its scope appears to have no limits. Northern Ireland after World War II and northern England today may be cited as cases of its broad impact; but it can also be highly effective on an individual level. The persistence of the abuse of patronage on this scale needs further examination.

There is a need for clarity here. Tyranny and dictatorship aim to destroy opposition and thereby enlarge personal power. Patronage should not be so ambitious. A variety of patrons can and must live side by side. Yet the tendency with patronage, as Montesquieu says, is to suppress dissent and opposition. Here it oversteps a red line. This line must be recognised and respected.

For comparative purposes a second glance at the USA is worthwhile and Wikipedia a good place to start. Here it is suggested that the patronage system may be identified with a spoils system. Andrew Jackson pioneered it: support for office in return for votes; favours exchanged between donors and party. Bryce in volume two of The American Commonwealth also has something to say about ‘Tammany Hall’ politics and associated matters and today the press is full of reports on the workings of the PACs (Political Action Committee) and SuperPACs and the malign use of internet for political purposes.

Yet these analyses are too little. Patronage should work to enhance performance; in practice its effect is to destroy, disrupt or weaken criteria of performance. There is a very clear need to clarify boundaries here. The need follows in the wake of neglect of contract and indeed the prevalence of subversion of any legislation that asserts a principle.

Yet loyalty and security are two considerations that are used to justify patronage. This minimalist use of patronage cannot be denied. It persists today and is valid and may be integral part of the secret structure of the state. But it is absolutely correct to target the excesses of patronage.

Montesquieu, whom I have mentioned, was concerned about the power of patronage under Walpole. He says that patronage goes against freedom of opposition. I would add that it belongs only to those with money – e.g. the capitalist elite. The freedom for opposition to continue without harassment is important. Montesquieu had first-hand experience of Louis XIV’s France. The danger with patronage is that in excess it suppresses opposition. This is primeval. The state cannot exist without the integration of distinct interests; but integration is not the same as suppression. Yet the boundary between legitimate and excess patronage is obscure, just as the border between opposition and treason may be unclear. Nevertheless, the key is to be found in the visibility in the consequences: when patronage runs to excess, the good functioning of the social system ceases and that is evident for all to see.

The Civil Service must accommodate dissent. Firstly, change of government following elections entails change of preferred staff for Civil Service work. But there should be no mass sackings of Civil Servants just because a government changes; tolerance of dissent is a necessity in a democracy and the way from dissent to treason is much longer and more hazardous than is often recognised.

The previous establishment, who are now the dissenters, may or may not retain views and opinions that are relevant either at once or in the future. At the present point in time this consideration has particular implications. For, Government databases, no less than other stores of government information, become controversial. Are they to be accessible to the new government? Or does the new government bring in its own? Or is government information to be divided according to its ’owners’? Further, this challenge is reinforced by the need for distinct levels of security in government. This issue is not capable of simple solution. But the most elementary implication of computerisation is the requirement for standardisation (in database fields for instance, and this annihilates the long-established acceptance of personalised decisions, that may truly be conveyed merely by a ‘wink and a nod’.

Here there is oil on the road resulting in skids. Excessive patronage is not a stone’s throw removed from organised crime. I have just noted that patronage has close links to the secret state. This is legitimate. But hence also is derived the linkage of secret state to organised crime. When patronage gets out of hand, the secret state is over-extended and organised crime flourishes. This trend has been taken too far today and must be reversed. The problem is that secrecy can conceal too much. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to detect, from an external viewpoint, that homicide rates, or levels of drug trafficking, for example, are too high.

I note these points but critical analysis as a basis for reform is by itself difficult. We must advance – but how do we do it? I alone cannot solve this problem. Yet it is clear to me that major issues of structure must be addressed and they will not be resolved by re-introducing personal interests reeking of a long past era of petty monarchies and other small half-formed states. Certainly, public protest is a necessity if change is to be achieved, but it must be well-directed protest. One would think that Parliament is an excellent channel for giving direction to protest but to do so it must turn through 180 degrees to ensure that its critical responsibilities are truly directed against the ruling class.

This issue reaches crisis point with the development of modern science. Today biological and medical science, like other sciences, not least those of communication in both its material and societal aspects, has advanced in giant steps.

Is traditional ethics, in male-female relations certainly but in other fields also, really adequate? Can an ethic, whose core is money and whose veil is religion, as is so much patronage, really be defended today? But that is all capitalism is and it is impoverished and meagre, despite the power it holds. Patronage works one way only – from the top down. An ethic for today’s world must respond to the complexity of knowledge and structure. What if the data bases held in government administration are degraded, or do not well match the structure of either society or the secret system? And if this issue is not resolved, no data will be reliable or safe, and it will be there for sale, purchase or transfer, regardless of its validity.

PJC December 2025

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